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Abstract 
Millions of people are finding their livelihoods and security threatened as the effects of climate change 
intensify around the world. Migration as a response to the continuing ecological crisis is often the only 
pathway to safety. However, the future of such migrants is uncertain given the lack of mechanisms and 
systems to provide legal inclusion for displaced populations. In this paper, I challenge the existing 
international frameworks and point out the inadequacies in protecting victims of climate migration. To 
address these shortcomings, I suggest a new framework consisting of three features: systematic use of 
technology and data to determine populations in need of protection, the development of a system of 
bilateral and multilateral agreements, and the logistical and financial support of supranational institutions. I 
discuss the importance of framing in a world of increasingly militarized borders and anti-immigrant 
sentiment and advocate for climate change migration to be framed as disaster relief for the sake of political 
viability. 
Note 
This project is a continuation of my independent study project through the School for International Training 
program in Geneva, Switzerland titled “The Impacts of Warming Coffee: The Climate Change-Coffee-
Migration Nexus in the Northern Triangle of Central America”, in which climate change migration is 
illustrated by exploring the effects of climate change on coffee growing communities in Central America. 
This thesis project acknowledges the many ways in which the environment can pose an existential threat to 
humans in the form of sudden ecological disasters and slow-onset effects of climate change and seeks to 
create a realistic framework for permanent and well-supported resettlement in the wake of a worsening 
environmental crisis. 
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Although environmentally triggered migration is far from a new phenomenon, the 
growing intensity of adverse effects of climate change in recent years has led to a more 
urgent need to facilitate the resettlement of the rising numbers of people fleeing climate-
related disasters. Benoit Mayer (2011) explains the two options that emerged for those 
affected adversely from climate change. First, in situ adaptation, like mitigating flood 
damage by creating floating gardens to prevent further destruction that leads to migration, 
or secondly, resettlement. He asserts that there’s a consensus among scientific and NGO 
literature that in situ adaptation is not always possible and resettlement becomes an 
unquestionable need (pp. 371-373). As more lives are altered by compounding effects of 
climate change, displacement due to environmental factors has become a key feature of 
the reality of the 21st century and is projected to continue.  
By contextualizing the relationship between climate change and migration, the 
striking need for a new framework to address the millions of people displaced, or soon to 
be displaced, as a result of climate change becomes readily apparent. I have illustrated 
this relationship in previous work titled: “The Impacts of Warming Coffee: The Climate 
Change-Coffee-Migration Nexus in the Northern Triangle of Central America” in 2019. I 
will now review a number of crucial issues revealed in this project that must be taken into 
account in order to understand the need for a new legal framework around climate and 
human migration.  
The first is the interconnectedness of factors that drive migration, and the 
difficulty in tracking the specifics of human movement. Undoubtedly, there are 
Page | 2 
 
 
difficulties in understanding the precise impacts of specific drivers of migration, since the 
root causes are not easily singled out. There are often numerous factors that contribute to 
a decision to leave one’s home. Those who are on the move are not marked with a 
wristband that indicates a single reason for migration. Rather, someone crossing a border 
in search for employment may be tossed in a category of labor migrant or economic 
migrant, without considering the fact that they may also be displaced persons-- suffering 
an adverse effect of climate change, which slowly or suddenly destroyed their livelihood. 
The search for employment is only part of the story, although it may be the most visible 
immediate goal. It becomes obvious once we examine real migratory decisions that the 
dualistic understanding of forced displacement versus voluntary migration in law, and in 
general discourse, is a false binary.  
The second point is the importance of exploring climate change migration through 
a regionally focused lens. Climate change certainly does not affect the world 
homogeneously, and even within a region there are very significant disparities in how 
people’s environments are transformed. It is therefore critical to target studies and 
eventually adjust policies to be sensitive to the situations and to the needs of the people in 
a specific region, keeping in mind the most vulnerable. For the purposes of this essay, my 
focus is Central American emigration. Migration from the three countries in the spotlight-
- Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador-- is typically characterized as a response to 
economic turmoil and gang violence (Lynch, 2019, p. 12). Environmental factors are 
seldom associated as a trigger and are regularly overshadowed in public discourse and 
literature by alluring stories of violence.  
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In this previous work, I illustrate the role of climate change in Central American 
out-migration, examining specifically the coffee growing industry. Although Central 
America is historically an arid region, recently the frequency and intensity of droughts is 
rising which significantly impacts agricultural production, including coffee (p. 15). The 
sensitive crop is also severely threatened by rising temperatures and irregular weather 
patterns attributed to climate change (p. 17). The rising temperatures also worsen the 
spread of Coffee Leaf Rust (CLR), a disease that reduces coffee cherry yields and 
devastates coffee growing communities.  
This brings us to another major point. Climate change can have devastating 
effects on entire communities which either directly leads to migration or exacerbates 
other factors that trigger migration.  Most coffee farming in Central America is done by 
smallholder farmers. For example, 97% of coffee producers in Guatemala are considered 
smallholder farmers, with the majority owning on average 1.2 Ha of land (Tay, 2018, pp. 
2-3). Therefore, when rust and rising temperatures threaten coffee yield across an area, 
many more people are affected than would be in a situation where a drought threatens 
large conventional corn farms like those in the United States.  
After a 2011 rust epidemic in Central America, roughly 80,000 hectares of land in 
Honduras was infected, wiping out half of the harvest for 30,000 farmers and completely 
destroying about 10,000 farmers’ harvests (Ward, Gonthier, and Nichols, 2017, p. 1082). 
After such farmers’ livelihood is destroyed, they are left with little choice in many cases 
but to move from their homes, either within the country, or transnationally. Whether the 
loss of agricultural production is seen as the driver itself, or conceptualized as the 
amplifier of other phenomena that lead to the exodus of coffee producers, there is an 
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undeniable relationship between climate change and the movement of people that is 
exemplified by the story of coffee production in Central America.  
Lastly, it must be understood that temperatures are continuing to elevate, and 
consequently the numbers of people on the move are projected to rise with them. Those 
who are displaced from climate change lack international protection and are often 
vulnerable to human rights abuses as they navigate a world of increasingly closed and 
militarized borders. However, the environment is progressively being recognized as a 
driving factor of human movement worthy of projection by international law as well as 
individual governments’ laws in response to both sudden and slow-onset disasters 
attributed to climate change. The responses to these disasters must not be a one-size fits 
all solution, but rather a number of regionally sensitive resettlement arrangements that 
take into account the need for protection. By recognizing and responding to the vast 
cultural, demographic, and ecological differences between and within different regions, 
policies can adequately and accurately safeguard the human rights of the millions of 
people who will inevitably be displaced by climate change. 
Terminology  
Within public discourse around migration in general, it's common to find a variety 
of terms used to label people who move such as migrant, refugee, asylum seeker, and 
internally displaced person, among others. These technical and legal labels are often 
contested and there has been no consensus around an appropriate label for those 
displaced from climate change. Those affected by sudden or slow-onset environmental 
disasters are not identified under a single conceptual or legal category and would find it 
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difficult to seek refugee status given the current framework laid out in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and the 1967 protocol.  
In these widely accepted and ratified regulatory frameworks, the term “refugee” is 
limited to “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing 
to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion” (UN General Assembly, 
1951, p. 152). Despite this association of refugee status with human persecution, in the 
1980s before the phrase “climate change” entered the scene, the term “environmental 
refugees” was commonly used by experts in the United Nations Environmental Program 
(UNEP) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). At this time, these 
organizations used “environmental refugee” to refer to people who had been forced out of 
where they lived due to an environmental disruption, whether it was considered 
temporary or permanent (Faiste and Shade, 2017, p. 5).  
Thomas Faiste and Jeannette Shade (2017) track the development of the 
terminology and show how an “environmental refugee” became a “climate refugee” 
before the use of the term “refugee” for those displaced by ecological factors became 
heavily disputed and rejected by the United Nations altogether. By the time the IPCC 
came out with its 4th report in 2007, “environmental migration” became the norm (p. 6). 
Compared to “refugee,” the term “migrant” is more of an umbrella term and defined by 
the IOM as “a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether 
within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a 
variety of reasons” (IOM, 2019, p. 130). In essence, the terms are often ambiguous and 
there has yet to be a global consensus given the complexity of the international 
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frameworks and the interconnectedness of the many factors that drive people from their 
habitats.  
Such ambiguous terminology is rooted in the complexity of migration itself, and 
the interacting reasons people end up on the move. There is not simply a clean dichotomy 
of voluntary migrants and forced refugees. Benoit Mayer (2011) notes that “climate 
migrants should surely be considered closer to political refugees than to ‘ordinary’ 
migrants” (p. 381), since those fleeing in both cases are trying to escape environments 
where survival is questionable and fundamental rights are clearly lacking. In my writing 
and for the purposes of this discussion, I intentionally use the term “climate migrant” or 
phrases like “those displaced by climate change” in order to be inclusive of all 
individuals who are moving as a result of climate change, regardless of what degree of 
choice they are perceived to have in the matter. The lack of consensus over definitions 
and labels is only the beginning of the intricacies in the world’s response to climate 
migrants.  
Bridging the protection gaps: who is responsible to 
address displacement? 
 
 It’s well established in both scholarship and political debates that there is a 
fundamental gap in international law and existing legal frameworks when it comes to 
addressing those on the move due to climate change. The United Nations General 
Assembly, in their 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants recognizes a 
significant number of people who left their homes because of climate change and 
discusses the reality that those we currently call migrants and refugees actually 
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experience common challenges and vulnerabilities (p. 2). Therefore, they call the 
movements of these people “global phenomena that call for global approaches and global 
solutions”. They follow this up by declaring that “no one state can manage such 
movements on its own.” (UN General Assembly, 2016, p. 2) This approach has 
implications for the discussion of “burden sharing” where it must be recognized that one 
state should not have to host an entire community displaced by climate change.  
  In their 2018 Global Compact on migration, The UN General Assembly 
recognizes the necessity to “enhance cooperation on international migration in all its 
dimensions” (p. 2). This includes strengthening their mapping abilities to be able to 
predict and address movements that resulted from both sudden and slow onset natural 
disasters (p. 10). Taking into account adverse effects of climate change, the Global 
Compact also discusses the need to integrate displacement considerations into disaster 
preparedness strategies between neighboring countries. Such strategies would include 
contingency planning, evacuation planning, mechanisms of registering or screening 
displaced people and addressing their needs, and so on (p. 10). In the same section the 
Compact advocates for developing regional approaches to address vulnerabilities and 
provide humanitarian relief. This compact is non-binding, and the authors recognize 
national sovereignty when it comes to a state’s right to determine legislative and policy 
measures to implement their suggestions. This leaves the question of how to approach the 
implementation of these grand ideas. They suggest that implementation requires support 
from the global, regional, national, and local levels (p. 3).    
In Joseph Caren’s The Ethics of Immigration (2013), he challenges the current 
organization of the world and the increasing implementation of strict border control in 
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response to the many types of immigration. Rather than creating a specific plan or policy 
proposal, Carens’ goal is to “challenge complacency” and to illustrate how current 
practices deny basic freedoms and maintain harmful inequality (p. 295). Caren’s specific 
focus is on states’ responsibilities to admit and resettle refugees. Although I believe those 
displaced from climate change should not legally fall under the current refugee 
framework, Carens’ list of duties to admit refugees is inseparably linked to a state's duties 
to accept climate migrants.  
Carens’ list of reasons that generate a state’s duty to accept refugees include a 
causal connection, where the state has a duty to accept refugees since their actions have 
led to the destruction of livelihoods. “We should already be starting to think about 
environmental refugees,” he wrote in 2013, noting that there are arguments suggesting 
that rich democratic states should accept more ‘environmental refugees’ since they are 
largely responsible for anthropogenic climate change. Although there may be merit to 
this argument, at this point in time this specific causal link is not well developed and, in 
fact, not necessary to advocate for a just system of climate migration governance.  
 Humanitarian concern is Carens’ second reason for a state to accept refugees. 
Simply put, “...they have an urgent need for a safe place to live and we are in a good 
position to provide it” (p. 195). Safety and security of those migrating is often threatened, 
and it is reasonable to call for humanitarian aid to prevent unnecessary insecurity or even 
loss of life. Environmental disasters that lead to displacement make resettlement a 
humanitarian obligation.  
Lastly, Carens argues, on page 196, that being a part of the state system 
presupposes a duty to correct the failures of the nation-state system. Humans drew 
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boundaries on top of land, and when the land cannot be lived on, for whatever reason, 
there must be a safe remedy for one who has fled across a boundary in order for these 
lines to remain legitimate. Under the modern nation state, we should recognize that there 
will be failures in any social institution that we create. In fact, it is our duty to correct 
these failures. Supporting safe and orderly movement of people, particularly by those 
affected adversely by climate change between states is possibly the most visible failure 
today in the context of the nation state. To address this failure, philosophers like Carens 
entreat us to consider our ethical obligations, and legal experts like Benoit Mayer work to 
re-imagine the legal mechanisms through which we protect those on the move. 
 In his 2011 article, Benoit Mayer presents five guiding principles, some of which 
he pulls from outside international legal documents, to illustrate what an ideal framework 
would look like. Given the fact that climate change migration can be foreseen well in 
advance, unlike many cases that result in political asylum claims, he determines that 
well-planned and voluntary resettlement should be preferred over emergency disaster 
relief (p. 389). In addition to an early response, his second guiding principle is the 
necessity to respect individual and collective rights, and Mayer adds that collective 
resettlement is important to preserve social structures (p. 393). Taking a global approach 
is his third principle, since climate change is clearly a global problem (p. 393). He then 
goes on to ask the question: who pays for it? His answer is the application of the principle 
of “common but differentiated responsibility that recognizes that climate change is a 
global problem, but that countries have different abilities and responsibilities when it 
comes to resettling climate migrants” (p. 395). Lastly, he includes the principle of 
subsidiarity, which he adapts from the treaty on the European Union, which ensures the 
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individual states and communities have agency in assisting their populations in 
resettlement, but when they cannot, it becomes the responsibility of the larger 
communities to intervene and ensure human rights are accessible (p. 398). Applying this 
principle to climate migrant resettlement, if, theoretically bilateral agreements fail, 
political leadership from within the region must step in to assist in ensuring a safe 
journey to resettlement.  
Of course, Mayer's ideal framework is international in nature, given the global 
reach of climate change, however, he does raise an important point regarding the 
possibility for regional agreements and the communal approach to solving this puzzle 
while still acknowledging the diversity in resources of the potential states involved. I 
would agree with Mayer in that a new framework ideally should be guided by the idea of 
creating well planned voluntary resettlement programs, common but differentiated 
responsibility, a recognition of collective rights, and a principle of subsidiarity if nations 
are unable to take care of people on the move. Of course, principles vary across regions 
and interests shift as new leaders come to power. With this in mind, there are a number of 
different ways in which scholars, politicians, and international bodies have envisioned the 
appropriate response to millions of people being displaced as a result of climate change. 
Below, I describe a potential framework that draws on these principles, with particular 
attention to the ways such planning might manifest within the Central/North American 
regional system. 
In an ideal world: no matter my occupation, location, or situation, if I decide that 
the place that I reside is no longer livable, I should have the right to leave such a place 
and go somewhere else. The process for doing so should be simple and understandable. If 
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my search for a new residence happens to be over the lines drawn by other people, I 
should explain my situation to the political entity that claims jurisdiction/sovereignty in 
the space, and they should ask if I need help. If I am fleeing a hurricane, this owner 
should give me temporary protection until returning to my home is no longer threatening. 
If I flee rising sea levels flooding my home and must leave, this landowner should offer 
me a permanent pathway to safety where I can participate socially and economically. I 
should not have to understand hundreds of dense pages of legal documents and have to 
argue my case. In other words, any ideal solution to the problem of environmental 
displacement must take as its starting point the fundamental needs of vulnerable people 
who must leave their homes and should provide them with practical and manageable 
pathways forward. 
 Indeed, there are precedents in policy and practice for the establishment of such 
remedies. Globally, migration due to environmental factors is neither new, nor 
completely ignored in regional agreements or international debates, as Vincent Chetail 
from the global migration center at the graduate institute of Geneva remarked in an 
interview for my previous research (Lynch 25). However, considering the empirical 
reality of the current inadequacies in protecting those moving in response to the 
environment, it’s time to expedite the application of a more comprehensive new 
framework. Rather than a top-down, “one-size fits all” remedy conceived by the United 
Nations, a new framework would be more effective if it consists of a system of tailored 
agreements that can fit the varying needs of many communities living in diverse regions. 
An adequate system designed to protect those displaced by climate change must 
contain pathways to safe and orderly resettlement. A war that has created a political 
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refugee may end, and the previously unlivable places may find peace; so, the person 
displaced could reasonably decide to move back. However, if the ocean has taken your 
home as a result of climate change, or you have succumbed to unprecedented effects of 
desertification, return may never be possible. It’s important to envision sustainable and 
lasting remedies to migration related to climate change disasters, just as we account for 
the possibility of political refugees requiring permanent resettlement (even as others are 
given an opportunity to repatriate). 
 
Towards a Framework for Climate Migration  
 In recognizing the design flaws of the current arrangements, the question 
becomes: in what direction must we head to ensure the survival and security of millions 
of people displaced by climate change?  An effective and sufficient system would look 
like a collection of flexible bilateral and multilateral agreements between nations. These 
agreements could potentially address migration more comprehensively, but at minimum 
they should include contingency plans to protect those who are forcibly displaced -- 
either suddenly, or as a result of slow onset ecological disasters. Every region is unique 
culturally, historically, and politically. Local complexities make it difficult to establish a 
universal standard for how to assist those displaced. Given the difficulty with 
implementing one-size fits all legal frameworks into vastly different regions, it would be 
far more effective to structure bilateral and multilateral agreements that are more tailored 
to fit the specific needs of those on the move and the recipient nations. International 
bodies should support these agreements and monitor their effectiveness to ensure that 
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millions of people moving will be able to enjoy human rights. The United Nations should 
monitor and support, rather than enforce rules in this case.  
In this section, I will delineate how we can move towards this type of regionally 
responsive framework using the Central/North American region as a case study. I explain 
what features a functioning framework will include at a minimum: First, is systematic 
data-gathering and data-sharing at the regional level as a way of identifying the 
populations at risk for climate-related vulnerability with mechanisms to provide 
immediate protection to individuals who need it. A second criteria would be the 
development of a system of bilateral and multilateral agreements that are built around 
current migration patterns resulting from climate change. These agreements should offer, 
at the very least, safe ways to temporarily shelter, with options for permanent 
resettlement on a case-by-case basis to allow for orderly responses to anticipated 
displacement. Lastly, the logistical and financial support of supranational institutions to 
provide firmly established monitoring bodies to track and ensure that regional agreements 
are effective. Every step must be taken carefully to mitigate the potential crisis of 
thousands of more people leaving their homes and making dangerous journeys to places 
that have no clear plan in place to assist them.  
When one is displaced because of climate change related factors, they often find 
themselves in a legal limbo given the complex nature of migration and slowly-adapting 
migration law. Most migrants, and even most displaced people, do not fit the refugee 
requirements as defined in the aforementioned 1951 Refugee Convention and subsequent 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, even if the environment they’re leaving 
is completely unlivable. In this legal limbo-- forced to move, but with no recognized right 
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to migrate-- vulnerability is common and peoples’ rights are threatened or even 
completely invisible. Lacking permanent legal status can make one more susceptible to 
labor exploitation, for example.  
An updated system of migration governance that is people-centered is the remedy 
to the intensifying vulnerabilities of those displaced from climate change. In response, 
there are three different registers of thinking. The first would be the ethical ideal. Ideally, 
there would be an immediate global recognition that climate change is forcibly driving 
people from their homes, resulting in thousands of people finding themselves in 
vulnerable and dangerous situations. Ideally, the recognition of such an alarming reality 
would lead to internationally motivated and well-funded responses to ensure the rights of 
those displaced are protected. Of course, in a world where borders are militarized and 
anti-immigrant sentiments are high, there needs to be a more politically viable solution. 
This thinking is in a more pragmatic register. In order to be politically viable, climate 
change migration must be dealt with transparently and through comprehensive ground-up 
regional approaches that are tailored for particular regions, with careful attention paid to 
each nation’s ability to fund and support safe resettlement. Lastly, in order to sell a 
pragmatic solution, we need to think in terms of framing. A specific narrative framework 
that presents this movement in response to climate change as disaster displacement is 
necessary, and migrant resettlement should be diplomatically and tactfully constructed as 
a form of disaster relief.  
In many cases, ecological crises are observable, and exacerbation of 
environmental catastrophes is predictable. It’s only a matter of time before many 
locations become unlivable. Since these events are to a degree, foreseeable, it’s possible 
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to establish contingency plans for what to do when the people are forced to leave. For 
example, the process of desertification is usually gradual; it allows quite a bit of time for 
experts to calculate the potential numbers of people that are forced to move and for 
neighboring states to decide how many of these people they are able to resettle and for 
what duration.  As noted above, coffee growing communities in Central America are 
deeply affected by climate change and there is a clear link between rising temperatures in 
the area and lower coffee yield, whether it’s due to easier spreading of agricultural 
diseases, or more intense and longer droughts. Migration as a result of this phenomenon 
is predictable and observable through modern technology and data analysis. However, 
it’s not being tracked in any kind of systematic way; countries are not sharing this 
information and analyzing it together as a matter of regional security. I will discuss below 
the importance of collaborative research and data gathering in greater depth. People 
living in these coffee-dependent communities are left with little choice but to move 
elsewhere and many migrate transnationally in the total absence of any policy or 
institutional support.  
The United Nations and other international bodies known for their data collection 
like the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre (IDMC), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and the South Centre must conjoin research efforts and share data 
accordingly to best inform those governments involved in establishing regional 
contingency plans for climate disaster relief. In a world of satellite imagery, artificial 
intelligence, and endless amounts of information at the fingertips of billions, an 
unexpected disaster should be extremely rare. Satellite imagery is already being used by 
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academics to track the movements of migrants by measuring the intensity and location of 
nighttime lights (Niedomysl et al., 2017, pp. 591-605). Additionally, organizations like 
the IDMC are beginning to use Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to be able to 
monitor where people are moving within nations (Lynch, 2019, p. 15).   
The reality revealed from this data must be recognized within regional agreements 
and mechanisms must be clearly established to adequately and smoothly resettle those 
forced from their land with clear pathways to permanent residency, given the irreversible 
nature of some effects of a rapidly changing planet. Regional frameworks built around 
current patterns of human movement are necessary to ensure safe and healthy migration. 
In Olopa, Guatemala, nearly half the residents have fled to the United States after the 
coffee growing community suffered heavy losses directly related to rising temperatures 
(Kahn, 2014). The surrounding countries have the information to create a regional 
agreement to prepare for those displaced from Olopa. The governments of The United 
States, Honduras, and Mexico to name a few neighbors, should establish a contingency 
plan with the government of Guatemala, informed by accurate data and input from the 
local communities to ensure the safe and necessarily permanent resettlement of those 
displaced. There is a glaring need for carefully tailored and preemptive solutions to 
potential problems associated with “unexpected” numbers of people crossing borders, 
considering the complex differences amongst regions, and since climate change does not 
affect nation-states homogeneously. 
With a goal of regional resilience and the avoidance of human rights catastrophes, 
new migration governance is necessary in the form of contingency planning. A modern 
relevant example of a functional regionally focused framework to address displaced 
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people is known as MIRPS, or the Comprehensive Regional Protection and Solutions 
Framework. This framework, born from the 2017 San Pedro Sula Declaration, is 
designed primarily to address forced displacement and facilitate the protection of 
refugees in Belize, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and more 
recently El Salvador (p. 6). Despite the fact that this framework is intended to assist 
refugees fleeing human persecution, and is careful to exclude those displaced from 
climate change, it still remains an incredibly valuable model to use in constructing a 
framework for the protection of climate migrants, since those displaced from human 
persecution often experience similar vulnerabilities as those displaced from climate 
change.  
As mentioned in the beginning, the relationship between climate change and 
migration is complex, and people are driven from their homes for many interrelated 
reasons. Sudden-onset disasters like hurricanes, floods, etc. require neighboring countries 
to be prepared for the increasing frequency of sudden ecologically destructive events 
(IPCC, 2018, p. 4). Offices on the ground of neighboring countries should be able to 
assess these events and determine when protection should be offered. Such protections 
would not need to be ongoing; rather, offices coordinating climate-related migration 
processing could respond to both acute and slow-building situations of forced migration 
in an ad hoc way if they were provided with appropriate discretion. 
The United States’ Temporary Protected Status (TPS) is an example of an ad hoc 
application of certain legal protections. This mechanism even recognizes environmental 
disasters as qualifying for the status “such as an earthquake, hurricane, or epidemic, that 
results in a substantial but temporary disruption of living conditions, and because of 
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which the foreign state is temporarily unable to adequately handle the return of its 
nationals” (American Immigration Council, 2018, p. 1). The problem with TPS is that it’s 
more reactionary and is effectively a temporary promise not to deport people.  Legal 
frameworks must provide a permanent plan for those who are unable to return to their 
places of origin. Benoit Mayer (2011) points out the fact that migrants who are accepted 
on a temporary basis are more likely to be admitted into a country only when the country 
can take advantage of them, and therefore, he advocates for climate-related migration to 
be seen as permanent in nature and to allow for full naturalization and citizenship status 
to protect against exploitation (pp. 390-391). However, TPS grants people the ability to 
obtain work permits and allows for other privileges that one may not have had access to 
before. Although this sense of temporary protection is not ideal, it is the seed for 
something far greater.  
Ideally, a temporary protective status would be more active in providing 
protection and assistance to somebody beyond a promise not to deport people on an 
indefinite but temporary basis. In the event of a sudden disaster like a hurricane or a more 
slow-onset disaster such as a disease like coffee leaf rust threatening communities’ 
livelihoods, a surrounding coalition of nation states should have in place a plan to offer 
protections such as emergency housing and other direct assistance to those who have lost 
everything. Contingency plans for unexpected natural disasters, which are understood to 
be exacerbated by climate change, must be well established around the world in order to 
prevent any type of additional burden to victims of natural disasters.   
People employed through the agriculture industry are among some of the most 
vulnerable because of the rapidly worsening effects of climate change. Thousands of 
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people in coffee producing areas remain the poorest and most sensitive to market and 
climate shocks (Eakin, Tucker, & Castellanos, 2005, p. 1). As described above, the coffee 
farming communities of Central America are in need of particular consideration in order 
to protect those who cannot sustain their livelihoods as a result of climate change. 
Realistically, a disaster relief plan for Central American coffee farming communities 
must be expertly led, data driven and rooted in collaborative collective action. Temporary 
protections need to be offered to address the imminent threat to safety and security, and 
pathways to permanent citizenship must exist.  
 In 2019, between Central and North America, what is known as the largest 
migration corridor in the world, over 60 million people were classified as migrants 
according to the UN (United Nations, 2019). Yet, under the current system, it’s nearly 
impossible to find how many of these people could be considered environmentally 
displaced. Accuracy is key in policy formation. Therefore, painting an accurate picture of 
where those Central American coffee farming communities are, and how they have been 
impacted by climate change is the starting point for writing an adequate relief plan. 
National and regionally specific data regarding internal displacement from the experts at 
the IDMC, and transnational migration monitored by those at the IOM is available and 
continuously being monitored. Research from these organizations, beyond keeping 
numbers, gives expert insight into why migration is happening and where people who 
migrate go. Looking more closely at this kind of data in tandem with satellite imagery, 
the phenomenon of Central American coffee-growing communities migrating because of 
climate change can be better understood and more adequately addressed.  
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 As data is analyzed, collective action must be taken in the efforts to resettle and 
protect the rights of those who are displaced from climate change. Cooperation is 
necessary on an international and national level, as well as amongst civil society, 
including the public and private sectors.  Regionally, in recognizing the general trend of 
movement from Central America to North America, the governments of The United 
States, Mexico, and Canada must work with those of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador 
under the close guidance of experts to discover what populations involved in the coffee 
growing process are displaced from climate change. Together, these countries should be 
able to understand specifically the needs of people from coffee farming communities and 
coordinate adequate humanitarian responses. For example if, like in Honduras in 2011, 
coffee leaf rust ravages the farms and transforms the lives of thousands of people 
involved in the production process, neighboring governments (local and national) as well 
as the multiple organizations and institutions involved must be able to ensure primarily 
the immediate safety of those affected as well as provide them with a pathway to 
reestablish long term self-reliance, even if that means citizenship in another state.   
As expressed, regional contingency plans to protect those displaced from 
environmental disasters linked to climate change must be supported by these international 
bodies in the form of money but also in the form of research. This isn’t to say the United 
Nations should fully fund a regional contingency plan for displaced people’s 
resettlement, but for those cases of necessity in which no surrounding nation has the 
means, emergency funds should be accessible. This would be in line with the 
aforementioned principle of subsidiarity. As we imagine a functional system of migration 
governance that would result in orderly and safe movement of people once their 
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environments become unlivable, it’s necessary to explore the ways in which this system 
would manifest itself in the modern political context.  
 
Displacement as disaster: the importance of framing  
 
In the 21st century, it would be an understatement to say that migration has been 
an increasingly politically polarizing subject. From “caravans” of people gathered like an 
army “invading” the United States to harrowing images of distressed children crawling 
off of boats after escaping the Syrian Civil War, migration and how to address it are very 
popular topics of conversation. There is certainly an observable hierarchy of who 
deserves to be in the United States in political discourse, as the diversification of 
migration streams in the 21st century was met with a xenophobic backlash. Such anti-
immigrant trends within the political context can help explain why protections for, and 
even acknowledgement of, climate migrants is lacking.  
The current binary structure of U.S. immigration law classifies all who arrive at 
the border without authorization as either labor migrants, who have no claims to stay in 
the U.S., or as asylum seekers, who may have a right to reside here if they can prove they 
are refugees. A family whose coffee farm was destroyed by rising temperatures and CLR 
that has decided to leave in hopes to survive will not qualify for asylum, but they may not 
be accurately identified with the concept of “labor migrant”-- as someone who is simply 
choosing to move in order to find a new job and a better life.  In light of antiquated U.S. 
immigration laws, climate migrants have a better chance of protection if the protective 
actions were motivated by a desire to provide humanitarian disaster relief, at least until 
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immigration law catches up with the aforementioned realities and seeking asylum on the 
grounds of environmental threats is normalized.  
Framing is a powerful tool in advocacy, and an integral piece of the puzzle if we 
wish to change the way that displaced people are treated around the world. Framing 
involves the use of specific language and narratives to create an image to represent 
something. Caution must be used when constructing an image of a climate migrant 
because oftentimes, framing becomes reality as we simplify knowledge for the purpose of 
dissemination. Benford and Snow call framing, when used as a verb, an “active, 
processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality 
construction” (p. 614). This is because framing is actually an active and fluid act of 
creating a picture for a purpose. It is a constantly evolving process which requires human 
effort to drive its evolution. They also note that framing is contentious because as the 
frames evolve, they are regularly deployed to challenge or dispute alternate frames within 
a political context (614). The intense politicization of migration in the 21st century can 
help to explain why addressing the needs of those displaced from climate change as 
refugees is highly contested.  
Considering the political sensitivities associated with migration, it would be most 
effective and accurate to frame the response to climate migration as disaster relief. When 
constructing an image of a climate migrant, it’s important to ensure that those displaced 
from climate change are conceptually distinct from labor migrants or traditional refugees 
and thus have different needs in order to find safety. Both slow-onset and sudden effects 
from climate change are typically characterized as disasters, and resettlement in the name 
of disaster relief is important to avoid the potential political roadblocks that would likely 
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emerge if one were to advocate for expanding the definition of refugees to encompass 
those displaced from climate change. Disaster-relief framing would be sufficient in 
establishing a sense that migrants displaced by climate change are deserving of 
protection. We need not attempt to expand the definition of refugee, since the goal is to 
establish systematic and lasting protections for climate migrants.  
Despite the importance of presenting advocacy in terms that work with the current 
field of political possibility, it’s important to note that political viability changes over 
time. Twenty years ago, it would have been much more difficult to convince the world of 
the need to devote time and resources to resettle those impacted by climate change. 
However, as science revealed the painful reality for many affected by climate change and 
the world began to listen, governments and almost every corner of civil society began to 
take a vested interest in how the actions of people affect the planet. A clear example of 
the shifting viability of particular policy proposals would be criminal justice reform in the 
United States. Jody Armour explains the bipartisan transformation in the political 
popularity of being tough on crime. He recounts that “A few years ago, the idea that 
being tough on crime would be a liability – not an asset – was unthinkable for both 
Democrats and Republicans.” (Armour, 2019, p. 1). Armour attributes the success in the 
criminal justice reformers to the power of activists and writers reframing mass 
incarceration as a civil rights crisis, intertwined with race, poverty and government 
policy.  
An important part of this re-framing of criminal justice policy was the data and 
evidence emerging from research, which exposed the negative consequences of the 
system created by the “tough on crime” policies of the 1980’s and 1990’s. The director of 
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the National Institute for Justice, Nancy Rodriguez (2019), published a paper on the value 
of scientific research in creating a better criminal justice system. She highlights the 
importance of policy leaning on research and emphasizes the role of both social and 
physical sciences working together to inform policy for criminal justice reform on many 
levels (pp. 292-293). The act of publicizing data and exposing the empirical reality of 
how policies (or lack of policies) affect real people in a technical and scientific way is a 
valuable method that should be used in framing climate migrant resettlement as disaster 
relief. 
 In efforts to construct policy around human displacement, disaster and risk 
framing are incredibly powerful. In a study by Pranathi Diwakar (2019), she illustrates 
how the government of Chennai, India was wildly successful in moving its urban slums 
to the outskirts of the city as a result of framing residents in the slums as being acutely 
vulnerable to natural disasters (pp. 1314-1315). Leaning on data and research to drive 
decisions proved to be effective in inspiring criminal justice reform in the U.S. and the 
use of disaster relief framing was successful in garnering support for slum relocation 
policies in Chennai, India. In terms of framing, it is likely that combining a disaster relief 
approach with expert-driven research and data will be successful in attracting support for 
a new framework for climate migrants.  Well-informed advocacy and careful framing is 
necessary to accurately represent climate migration and thus inspire policy makers to take 
expeditious action to protect the human rights of climate migrants. 




As our society transforms, and more devastating phenomena that lead to irregular 
migration are exposed, like the struggles of producing coffee in land where temperatures 
are rising and droughts are becoming more intense, the following question is critical.  
What can we do as scholars/policy actors to “nudge” the world towards the ideal, while 
recognizing the need to modify ideals in the short and medium term for pragmatic ends?  
 In this essay, I have pointed out the inadequacies of the current international 
frameworks in protecting victims of forced migrations attributed to climate change and 
have advocated for an updated framework rooted in principles of human rights and 
regional subsidiarity. This framework’s regional character allows for policies to be 
flexible and sensitive to local complexities and varying vulnerabilities. Of course, since 
adverse effects of climate change are felt around the world, there is a critical need for 
global support and coordination, whether it’s in the form of sharing data, research, and 
best practices, or institutional advising.  
 As we imagine a world where human rights are respected in every step of the 
migration process, whether the migration is considered forced or voluntary, advocacy and 
narrative framing plays a critical role in executing the nudge towards the ideal. Activism 
around climate change is already bold and abundant, but climate migrants must not be 
left out of this discourse. The message must put the human person at the center. Scenarios 
driving people from their homes vary immensely. However, whether classified as IDP, 
asylum seeker, labor migrant, or refugee, there is one thing we all share, and that is 
humanity.  
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